Process Created with an Elevated Token
editProcess Created with an Elevated Token
editIdentifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Privilege Escalation
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
Version: 6
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule query
edit/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */ process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and /* CreateProcessWithToken and effective parent is a privileged MS native binary used as a target for token theft */ user.id : "S-1-5-18" and /* Token Theft target process usually running as service are located in one of the following paths */ process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", "?:\\ProgramData\\*") and /* Ignores Utility Manager in Windows running in debug mode */ not (process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and process.parent.args : "/debug") and /* Ignores Windows print spooler service with correlation to Access Intelligent Form */ not (process.parent.executable : "?\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe" and process.executable: "?:\\Program Files*\\Access\\Intelligent Form\\*\\LaunchCreate.exe") and /* Ignores Windows error reporting executables */ not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe", "?:\\windows\\system32\\WerMgr.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe") and /* Ignores Windows updates from TiWorker.exe that runs with elevated privileges */ not (process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*\\TiWorker.exe" and process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\iissetup.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\iissetup.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\aspnetca.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\aspnetca.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lodctr.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\lodctr.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\netcfg.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*\\ngen.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*\\aspnet_regiis.exe")) and /* Ignores additional parent executables that run with elevated privileges */ not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe", "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*") and /* Ignores Windows binaries with a trusted signature and specific signature name */ not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : ("philandro Software GmbH", "Freedom Scientific Inc.", "TeamViewer Germany GmbH", "Projector.is, Inc.", "TeamViewer GmbH", "Cisco WebEx LLC", "Dell Inc"))
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Create Process with Token
- ID: T1134.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/