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Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP

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Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP

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Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Windows Printer Spooler service as a target. An adversary may use this primitive in combination with other techniques to elevate privileges on a compromised system.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.*
endgame-*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Credential Access
Elastic Endgame

Version: 102 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.3.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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process where event.type == "start" and process.name :
"rundll32.exe" and /* Rundll32 WbeDav Client */ process.args :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie") and /* Access to
named pipe via http */ process.args : ("http*/print/pipe/*",
"http*/pipe/spoolss", "http*/pipe/srvsvc")

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Technique:
- Name: Exploitation for Credential Access
- ID: T1212
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212/

Rule version history

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Version 102 (8.6.0 release)

Formatting only

Version 101 (8.5.0 release)

Updated query, changed from:

process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name : "rundll32.exe" and /* Rundll32 WbeDav Client */
process.args : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie") and /* Access
to named pipe via http */ process.args : ("http*/print/pipe/*",
"http*/pipe/spoolss", "http*/pipe/srvsvc")

Version 2 (8.4.0 release)

Formatting only

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