Kubernetes Pod Created With HostIPC
editKubernetes Pod Created With HostIPC
editThis rule detects an attempt to create or modify a pod using the host IPC namespace. This gives access to data used by any pod that also use the hosts IPC namespace. If any process on the host or any processes in a pod uses the hosts inter-process communication mechanisms (shared memory, semaphore arrays, message queues, etc.), an attacker can read/write to those same mechanisms. They may look for files in /dev/shm or use ipcs to check for any IPC facilities being used.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- logs-kubernetes.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Kubernetes
- Continuous Monitoring
- Execution
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 200 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editAn administrator or developer may want to use a pod that runs as root and shares the host’s IPC, Network, and PID namespaces for debugging purposes. If something is going wrong in the cluster and there is no easy way to SSH onto the host nodes directly, a privileged pod of this nature can be useful for viewing things like iptable rules and network namespaces from the host’s perspective. Add exceptions for trusted container images using the query field "kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.container.image"
Investigation guide
editRule query
editevent.dataset : "kubernetes.audit_logs" and kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision:"allow" and kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource:"pods" and kubernetes.audit.verb:("create" or "update" or "patch") and kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.hostIPC:true and not kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.containers.image: ("docker.elastic.co/beats/elastic-agent:8.4.0")
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Escape to Host
- ID: T1611
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Deploy Container
- ID: T1610
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610/
Rule version history
edit- Version 200 (8.6.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource:"pods" and kubernetes.audit.verb:("create" or "update" or "patch") and kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.hostIPC:true
-
- Version 100 (8.5.0 release)
-
- Formatting only