Kubernetes Pod Created With HostNetwork
editKubernetes Pod Created With HostNetwork
editThis rules detects an attempt to create or modify a pod attached to the host network. HostNetwork allows a pod to use the node network namespace. Doing so gives the pod access to any service running on localhost of the host. An attacker could use this access to snoop on network activity of other pods on the same node or bypass restrictive network policies applied to its given namespace.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- logs-kubernetes.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Kubernetes
- Continuous Monitoring
- Execution
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 100 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editAn administrator or developer may want to use a pod that runs as root and shares the host�s IPC, Network, and PID namespaces for debugging purposes. If something is going wrong in the cluster and there is no easy way to SSH onto the host nodes directly, a privileged pod of this nature can be useful for viewing things like iptable rules and network namespaces from the host’s perspective.
Investigation guide
editRule query
editkubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource:"pods" and
kubernetes.audit.verb:("create" or "update" or "patch") and
kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.hostNetwork:true
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Escape to Host
- ID: T1611
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/
Rule version history
edit- Version 100 (8.5.0 release)
-
- Formatting only