Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification

edit

Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification

edit

Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) SQLite database. This may indicate an attempt to bypass macOS privacy controls, including access to sensitive resources like the system camera, microphone, address book, and calendar.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • auditbeat-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • macOS
  • Threat Detection
  • Defense Evasion

Version: 5 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit

Rule query

edit
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name : "sqlite*" and process.args : "/*/Application
Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" and not process.parent.executable :
"/Library/Bitdefender/AVP/product/bin/*"

Threat mapping

edit

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

edit
Version 5 (8.4.0 release)
  • Updated query, changed from:

    process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
    process.name : "sqlite*" and process.args : "/*/Application
    Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db"
Version 3 (8.2.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 2 (7.15.0 release)
  • Formatting only