Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition

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Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-system.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Privilege Escalation
  • Active Directory

Version: 6 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.0.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition

Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used to add rights and/or modify Group Membership on GPOs by changing the contents of an INF
file named GptTmpl.inf, which is responsible for storing every setting under the Security Settings container in the GPO.
This file is unique for each GPO, and only exists if the GPO contains security settings.
Example Path: "\\DC.com\SysVol\DC.com\Policies\{PolicyGUID}\Machine\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf"

#### Possible investigation steps

- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity
is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
- Retrieve the contents of the `GptTmpl.inf` file, and under the `Privilege Rights` section, look for potentially
dangerous high privileges, for example: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, etc.
- Inspect the user security identifiers (SIDs) associated with these privileges, and if they should have these privileges.

### False positive analysis

- Inspect whether the user that has done the modifications should be allowed to. The user name can be found in the
`winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName` field.

### Related rules

- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO - 15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e
- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object - 16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046

### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
- Remove the script from the GPO.
- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scripts attached.

Rule query

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event.code: "5136" and
winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:"gPCMachineExtensionNames"
and winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F7
9F83A* and *803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B*)

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

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Version 6 (8.4.0 release)
  • Updated query, changed from:

    event.code: "5136" and
    winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:"gPCMachineExtensionNames"
    and winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F
    79F83A* and *803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B*)
Version 4 (8.3.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 3 (8.2.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 2 (8.1.0 release)
  • Formatting only