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Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation
editSuspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation
editIdentifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a default Windows install (phantom DLL) or one that can be loaded from a different location by a native Windows process. This may be abused to persist or elevate privileges via privileged file write vulnerabilities.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://itm4n.github.io/windows-dll-hijacking-clarified/
- http://remoteawesomethoughts.blogspot.com/2019/05/windows-10-task-schedulerservice.html
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
- https://shellz.club/edgegdi-dll-for-persistence-and-lateral-movement/
- https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/
- http://waleedassar.blogspot.com/2013/01/wow64logdll.html
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 2 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.14.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule query
editlibrary where dll.name : ( "wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll",
"WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll",
"Msfte.dll", "wow64log.dll", "WindowsCoreDeviceInfo.dll",
"Ualapi.dll", "wlanhlp.dll", "phoneinfo.dll", "EdgeGdi.dll",
"cdpsgshims.dll", "windowsperformancerecordercontrol.dll",
"diagtrack_win.dll" ) and not (dll.code_signature.subject_name :
("Microsoft Windows", "Microsoft Corporation") and
dll.code_signature.status : "trusted")
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Hijack Execution Flow
- ID: T1574
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Hijack Execution Flow
- ID: T1574
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
Rule version history
edit- Version 2 (7.14.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
library where dll.name : ( "wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll", "wow64log.dll", "WindowsCoreDeviceInfo.dll", "Ualapi.dll", "wlanhlp.dll", "phoneinfo.dll", "EdgeGdi.dll", "cdpsgshims.dll", "windowsperformancerecordercontrol.dll", "diagtrack_win.dll" ) and not (dll.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft Windows" and dll.code_signature.status : "trusted")
-