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Privileges Elevation via Parent Process PID Spoofing
editPrivileges Elevation via Parent Process PID Spoofing
editIdentifies parent process spoofing used to create an elevated child process. Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://gist.github.com/xpn/a057a26ec81e736518ee50848b9c2cd6
- https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/03/20/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.md
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 1
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule query
edit/* This rule is compatible with Elastic Endpoint only */ process
where event.action == "start" and /* process creation via seclogon
*/ process.parent.Ext.real.pid > 0 and /* PrivEsc to SYSTEM */
user.id : "S-1-5-18" and /* Common FPs - evasion via hollowing is
possible, should be covered by code injection */ not
process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Wermgr.exe", "?:\\W
indows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.e
xe") and not process.parent.executable :
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe" and not
(process.code_signature.subject_name in ("philandro
Software GmbH", "Freedom Scientific Inc.", "TeamViewer Germany GmbH",
"Projector.is, Inc.", "TeamViewer GmbH", "Cisco WebEx
LLC", "Dell Inc") and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/