Suspicious Execution from a Mounted Device

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Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-standard working directory. An attacker may use this technique to evade defenses.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Defense Evasion

Version: 2

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

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process where event.type == "start" and process.executable : "C:\\*" and
  (process.working_directory : "?:\\" and not process.working_directory: "C:\\") and
  process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and
  process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "mshta.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
                  "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM