User Account Creation

Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.*

Severity: low

Risk score: 21

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References: None

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Persistence

Version: 11

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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## Triage and analysis

### Investigating User Account Creation

Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.

This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files
for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.

### False positive analysis

- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before
investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.

### Related rules

- Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e

### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Delete the created account.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are
identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business
systems, and web services.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the
mean time to respond (MTTR).

## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
  process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and
  not process.parent.name : "net.exe" and
  (process.args : "user" and process.args : ("/ad", "/add"))

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Create Account
- ID: T1136
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Local Account
- ID: T1136.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/

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