AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted

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AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted

Detects deletion of an AWS CloudTrail trail via DeleteTrail API. Removing trails is a high-risk action that destroys an audit control plane and is frequently paired with other destructive or stealthy operations. Validate immediately and restore compliant logging.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

filebeat-*
logs-aws.cloudtrail-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Domain: Cloud
Data Source: AWS
Data Source: Amazon Web Services
Data Source: AWS Cloudtrail
Use Case: Log Auditing
Resources: Investigation Guide
Tactic: Defense Evasion

Version: 213

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit

Triage and analysis

Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

Investigating AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted

AWS CloudTrail is a service that enables governance, compliance, and operational and risk auditing of your AWS account. It logs API calls and related events, providing visibility into user activity. This rule identifies the deletion of an AWS log trail using the DeleteTrail API. Deleting a trail can eliminate visibility and is a strong indicator of defense evasion or sabotage.

Possible investigation steps

Actor & target
Identify aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn, user_agent.original, source.ip.
Confirm which trail was deleted (name/ARN, multi-region/organization status) from aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters or target.entity.id.
Blast radius
Determine whether it was the only trail or if organization/multi-region coverage remains.
Review preceding StopLogging or UpdateTrail and subsequent high-risk actions (IAM, S3, KMS, EC2 exports).
Data preservation
Verify S3 destinations and CloudWatch log groups for retained historical logs and file integrity validation.

False positive analysis

Planned deletion: Validate with tickets and decommissioning plans; ensure replacement/alternate trails exist.

Response and remediation

Recreate or re-enable compliant multi-region (or organization) trails immediately.
Investigate the actor’s recent activity; rotate creds if compromise is suspected.
Validate destination bucket policies, CMK policies, and event selectors for all active trails.
Hardening: Restrict cloudtrail:DeleteTrail and enforce guardrails via AWS Config/SCPs; alert on future deletions.

Additional information

AWS IR Playbooks
AWS Customer Playbook Framework
Security Best Practices: AWS Knowledge Center – Security Best Practices.

Rule query

edit

event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
    and event.provider: "cloudtrail.amazonaws.com"
    and event.action: "DeleteTrail"
    and event.outcome: "success"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Disable or Modify Tools
- ID: T1562.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/

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