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« Appendix Z: Downloadable rule update v8.17.7 Azure Entra ID Password Spraying (Non-Interactive SFA) »
Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.17] ›Downloadable rule update v8.17.7

AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User

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AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User

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Identifies when an SNS topic is created by a user who does not typically perform this action. Adversaries may create SNS topics to stage capabilities for data exfiltration or other malicious activities.

Rule type: new_terms

Rule indices:

  • filebeat-*
  • logs-aws.cloudtrail-*

Severity: low

Risk score: 21

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Cloud
  • Data Source: AWS
  • Data Source: Amazon Web Services
  • Data Source: AWS SNS
  • Resources: Investigation Guide
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Resource Development

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and Analysis

Investigating AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User

This rule detects the creation of an AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS) topic by a user who does not typically perform this action. Adversaries may create SNS topics to facilitate data exfiltration or other malicious activities.

This is a New Terms rule that only flags when this behavior is observed for the first time on a host in the last 10 days.

Possible Investigation Steps

1. Identify the Actor and Context

  • User Identity and Role:
  • Examine aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn to determine who created the SNS topic.
  • Identify whether the actor assumed a privileged IAM role (aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AssumedRole").
  • User Agent and Tooling:
  • Check user_agent.name to determine if this action was performed via the AWS CLI, SDK, or Console.
  • If aws-cli was used, review whether it aligns with typical automation or administrative behavior.
  • Source IP and Geographic Location:
  • Review source.ip and source.geo fields to confirm if the request originated from a trusted or unexpected location.

2. Evaluate the SNS Topic Creation

  • Topic Name and Purpose:
  • Check aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.name for the SNS topic name and determine whether it appears suspicious (e.g., random strings, unusual keywords).
  • Target Region and Account:
  • Verify cloud.region and cloud.account.id to ensure the SNS topic was created in an expected environment.
  • Associated API Calls:
  • Identify additional actions before or after this event using event.action values like:
  • Subscribe
  • Publish
  • SetTopicAttributes
  • These may indicate follow-up steps taken to misuse the SNS topic.

3. Analyze Potential Malicious Intent

  • Is This an Isolated Action or a Pattern?
  • Check if this user has previously created SNS topics using historical CloudTrail logs.
  • Look for multiple topic creations in a short period, which may suggest an automation script or malicious behavior.
  • Unusual Role Usage:
  • If aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn references an EC2 instance role, verify whether that instance typically performs SNS operations.
  • Potential Data Exfiltration or Persistence:
  • Review whether new subscriptions were added (Subscribe API action) to forward data externally.
  • If an SNS topic was configured to trigger Lambda functions or S3 events, it may indicate an attempt to persist in the environment.

False Positive Analysis

  • Legitimate Usage of SNS:
  • SNS is commonly used for event-driven notifications in AWS.
  • Check whether the SNS topic creation aligns with known DevOps, automation, or monitoring activities.
  • Routine IAM Role Activity:
  • If the user typically interacts with SNS, consider allowlisting expected IAM roles for this action.
  • AWS Services Creating Topics Automatically:
  • Some AWS services may auto-create SNS topics for alerts and monitoring. Confirm whether the creation was system-generated.

Response and Remediation

  • Confirm Authorization:
  • If the user was not expected to create SNS topics, verify whether their IAM permissions should be restricted.
  • Revoke Unauthorized Access:
  • If unauthorized, disable the access keys or IAM role associated with the event.
  • Monitor for Further SNS Modifications:
  • Set up additional monitoring for SNS Publish or Subscription events (Publish, Subscribe).
  • Enhance IAM Policy Controls:
  • Consider enforcing least privilege IAM policies and enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA) where applicable.
  • Investigate for Persistence:
  • Check whether the SNS topic is being used as a notification channel for Lambda, S3, or other AWS services.

Rule query

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event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
    and event.provider: "sns.amazonaws.com"
    and event.action: "CreateTopic"
    and event.outcome: "success"
    and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AssumedRole"
    and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn: *i-*

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

« Appendix Z: Downloadable rule update v8.17.7 Azure Entra ID Password Spraying (Non-Interactive SFA) »
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