Process Creation via Secondary Logon

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Identifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-system.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Privilege Escalation

Version: 2 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Rule query

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sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m [authentication where
event.action:"logged-in" and event.outcome == "success" and user.id :
("S-1-5-21-*", "S-1-12-1-*") and /* seclogon service */
process.name == "svchost.exe" and winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName
: "seclogo*" and source.ip == "::1" ] by
winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId [process where event.type == "start"]
by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

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Version 2 (8.6.0 release)
  • Updated query, changed from:

    sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m [authentication where
    event.action:"logged-in" and event.outcome == "success" and
    user.id:"S-1-5-21-*" and /* seclogon service */ process.name ==
    "svchost.exe" and winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName : "seclogo*"
    and source.ip == "::1" ] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId [process
    where event.type == "start"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId