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Process Creation via Secondary Logon
editProcess Creation via Secondary Logon
editIdentifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-system.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 2 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editRule query
editsequence by host.id with maxspan=1m [authentication where event.action:"logged-in" and event.outcome == "success" and user.id : ("S-1-5-21-*", "S-1-12-1-*") and /* seclogon service */ process.name == "svchost.exe" and winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName : "seclogo*" and source.ip == "::1" ] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId [process where event.type == "start"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
Rule version history
edit- Version 2 (8.6.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m [authentication where event.action:"logged-in" and event.outcome == "success" and user.id:"S-1-5-21-*" and /* seclogon service */ process.name == "svchost.exe" and winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName : "seclogo*" and source.ip == "::1" ] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId [process where event.type == "start"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
-