PowerShell MiniDump Script
editPowerShell MiniDump Script
editThis rule detects PowerShell scripts capable of dumping process memory using WindowsErrorReporting or Dbghelp.dll MiniDumpWriteDump. Attackers can use this tooling to dump LSASS and get access to credentials.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Credential Access
Version: 9
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating PowerShell MiniDump Script PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code. Attackers can abuse Process Memory Dump capabilities to extract credentials from LSASS or to obtain other privileged information stored in the process memory. #### Possible investigation steps - Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics. - Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. - Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior. - Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours. - Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks. - Check if the imported function was executed and which process it targeted. ### False positive analysis - Regular users do not have a business justification for using scripting utilities to dump process memory, making false positives unlikely. ### Related rules - PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe - Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software. - Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. - Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. - Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Rule query
editevent.category:process and powershell.file.script_block_text:(MiniDumpWriteDump or MiniDumpWithFullMemory or pmuDetirWpmuDiniM)
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
-
Technique:
- Name: OS Credential Dumping
- ID: T1003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
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Sub-technique:
- Name: LSASS Memory
- ID: T1003.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
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Sub-technique:
- Name: PowerShell
- ID: T1059.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/