IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.

« Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE »

› ›

Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32

edit

Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32

edit

Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
endgame-*

Severity: low

Risk score: 21

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References: None

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Execution
Tactic: Credential Access
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Data Source: Elastic Endgame
Data Source: Elastic Defend
Data Source: Sysmon

Version: 109

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Setup

edit

Setup

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2. Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp. For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html

Rule query

edit

process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and
  process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.command_line != null and
  /* common FPs can be added here */
  not process.parent.args : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll,RunAsNewUser_RunDLL",
                             "C:\\WINDOWS\\*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
Sub-technique:
- Name: PowerShell
- ID: T1059.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Windows Command Shell
- ID: T1059.003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Technique:
- Name: Unsecured Credentials
- ID: T1552
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
- ID: T1218
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Rundll32
- ID: T1218.011
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/

« Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE »