A newer version is available. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe
editUnusual Parent Process for cmd.exe
editIdentifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 8
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Setup If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule query
editprocess where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.parent.name : ("lsass.exe", "csrss.exe", "epad.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "dllhost.exe", "LogonUI.exe", "wermgr.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "jucheck.exe", "jusched.exe", "ctfmon.exe", "taskhostw.exe", "GoogleUpdate.exe", "sppsvc.exe", "sihost.exe", "slui.exe", "SIHClient.exe", "SearchIndexer.exe", "SearchProtocolHost.exe", "FlashPlayerUpdateService.exe", "WerFault.exe", "WUDFHost.exe", "unsecapp.exe", "wlanext.exe" )
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/