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Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [7.17] ›Downloadable rule update v7.16.4

Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation

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Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation

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Identifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a default Windows install (phantom DLL) or one that can be loaded from a different location by a native Windows process. This may be abused to persist or elevate privileges via privileged file write vulnerabilities.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Persistence
  • Privilege Escalation

Version: 7

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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## Setup

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

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any where
 (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
 (
  /* compatible with Elastic Endpoint Library Events */
  (dll.name : ("wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll",
               "wow64log.dll", "WindowsCoreDeviceInfo.dll", "Ualapi.dll", "wlanhlp.dll", "phoneinfo.dll", "EdgeGdi.dll",
               "cdpsgshims.dll", "windowsperformancerecordercontrol.dll", "diagtrack_win.dll")
   and (dll.code_signature.trusted == false or dll.code_signature.exists == false)) or

  /* compatible with Sysmon EventID 7 - Image Load */
  (file.name : ("wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll",
               "wow64log.dll", "WindowsCoreDeviceInfo.dll", "Ualapi.dll", "wlanhlp.dll", "phoneinfo.dll", "EdgeGdi.dll",
               "cdpsgshims.dll", "windowsperformancerecordercontrol.dll", "diagtrack_win.dll")
   and not file.code_signature.status == "Valid")
  )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

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